The principal-agent problem in health care asserts that providers, being the imperfect agents of patients, will act to maximize their profits at the expense of the patients' interests. This problem applies especially where professional regulations are lacking and incentives exist to directly link providers' actions to their profits, such as a fee-for-service payment system. The current analysis tests for the existence of the principal-agent problem in the private health market in Vietnam by examining the prescribing patterns of private providers. I show that: (1) private providers were able to induce demand by prescribing more drugs than public providers for a similar illness and patient profile; (2) private providers were significantly more likely to prescribe injection drugs to gain trust among the patients; and (3) patients' education as a source of information and empowerment has enabled them to mitigate the demand inducement by the providers. The hypotheses are supported with evidence from the Vietnam National Health Survey 2001-02, the first and, so far, only comprehensive health survey in the country.
in the private health sector, where provider regulation is often weak and consumer organizations are rarely in place to protect patient interests; and further, many countries still rely heavily on fee-for-service as a main provider payment method, which renders them susceptible to induced demand. Although evidence is limited, existing studies have shown a clear financial incentive behind provider behaviour, leading to overprescribing of antibiotics, injections and brandname drugs (Trap et al. 2002; Park et al. 2005; James et al. 2009) .
As in many other developing countries, private health services in Vietnam are not a recent phenomenon. Private health service provision has been officially recognized since the mid-1980s, with the country's embarkation on health sector reform (Ha et al. 2002) . The legal basis for the private sector was established through a ratification of the Ordinance on Private Medical and Pharmaceutical Practice in 1993 and its subsequent revision in 2003. Since then, the private sector has developed strongly in both quantity and complexity. By the end of 1998, the Ministry of Health official records showed 19 836 private practices and 14 182 pharmacies (Ha et al. 2003) . Ten years later, these numbers had increased to 30 000 and 21 600 for practices and pharmacies, respectively (Vietnam Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2008) . While occupying a significant share of the ambulatory market, the private sector has made major steps into the hospital sector. Early literature typically suggested that private services were concentrated more heavily in urban areas and served primarily patients of middle to high income (Population Council 1999) . However, mounting subsequent evidence questioned the consistency of this finding (Ha et al. 2002; Tuan et al. 2005; Thuan et al. 2008) . For example, using data from the Vietnam Demographic and Health Survey 2002, Do found no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of delivery in the private sector among women from different income groups (Do 2009 ). In terms of interpersonal quality of care, private practitioners usually gain client satisfaction due to their caring attitude and flexibility in timing of services and in accepting deferred payment (Population Council 1999) . Their technical quality of care, however, leaves much room for improvement (Tuan et al. 2005) . As an example, a national survey of private primary care practitioners revealed that less than 40% of the providers with the highest qualifications in the commune had sterilization equipment and only 10% of them scored 75% or above on how to recognize and treat conditions relating to hypertension and pregnancy (Vietnam Ministry of Health 2003) .
Despite the existence of the legal framework, regulation of private health care services in Vietnam remains weak. The Ordinance on Private Medical and Pharmaceutical Practice allows practitioners to write prescriptions but not to sell drugs, yet 85% of the private practitioners interviewed in a national survey reported selling drugs during consultations with patients (Vietnam Ministry of Health 2003) . Regulation is particularly weak in rural areas, where the public health authorities in charge do not have adequate human resources to carry out necessary inspections. In the years 2001 to 2002, while 83% of primary-level private practitioners in urban areas had licenses, the corresponding figure in rural areas was 37% (Vietnam Ministry of Health 2003) . Besides inspection and licensing requirements, there have been few efforts to use incentives to influence private sectors' behaviour. For example, Vietnam Health Insurance, the agency solely in charge of managing social health insurance programmes in Vietnam, has rarely encouraged provision of quality private services through contracting with private providers.
Several major differences between the incentive structures in the public and the private sectors affect the behaviour of individual providers. Because clinics, the most common form of private practice, are typically staffed by one or several providers, each provider's income is directly linked to the revenue of his/ her clinic. This system creates a strong incentive for each individual to maximize the clinic profits. Coupled with fee-forservice as the only form of charging patients, this maximization means increasing the volume of services, in particular the more lucrative ones. In the public sector, the incentive for each individual doctor to over-provide services to user fee patients is smaller. User fees account for a small share of the facility budget (18% of the public hospital budget in 2005) (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009) . Only up to 30% of user-fee revenue can be used to provide bonuses to hospital staff. Thus the link between a provider's drug and service prescription behaviour and his or her income is less direct in the case of the public than the private sector.
In the following section, I discuss the principal-agent relationship in the health care market and how it applies to provider prescription and dispensing. I next state the study hypotheses, which are derived from principal-agent theory and particular characteristics of the private health care market in Vietnam. This is followed by a presentation of data, methods and results. I conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for approaches to influence private sector behaviour.
Principal-agent relationship in the health care market
The relationship between provider and patient in the health care market is often characterized as a principal-agent relationship. The principal (the patient) appoints an agent (a health provider) to advise the principal in making decisions about treatment or to make decisions on the principal's behalf. The provider is expected to be a perfect agent, combining professional knowledge with the patient's preferences to determine a choice that the patient would make based on that information. The principal-agent problem arises as the provider chooses instead to maximize his or her own interests, which in many cases do not align with the patient's interests.
At the heart of the principal-agent relationship is the issue of information. As Arrow (1963) pointed out, the health care market is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Perhaps neither the provider nor the patient is certain about the disease and the optimal treatment. More likely, the provider has a greater knowledge of the patient's condition than the patient has. As the patient becomes more empowered and informed about his or her health conditions and possible treatment alternatives, the provider is less able to deviate from the role of a perfect agent.
The most often cited principal-agent problem is providerinduced demand. This dynamic occurs when the provider influences the patient's demand for care against the provider's interpretation of the best interest of the patient (McGuire  2000) . Provider-induced demand implies persuasive activity to shift the patient's demand curve according to the provider's self-interest. As in any agency problems, the degree of providerinduced demand depends on the information asymmetry between the provider and the patient. In addition, providerinduced demand is particularly associated with fee-for-service payment, which provides a clear incentive linking service volume to profits.
In the case of drug prescription and dispensing, the principalagent problem becomes more complex. Whereas in a typical health care setting the provider that decides on the treatment would ultimately perform the treatment, prescription and dispensing can be two completely separate functions. In fact, countries vary in whether they choose to separate or integrate prescription with dispensing, and each system has its own advantages and disadvantages (Eggleston 2008; Eggleston 2009) . Whether the provider is allowed to dispense or not, the variety and complexity of medicines present an ultimate testimony about the provider as the perfect agent for the patient. For example, for a mild upper-respiratory infection, the provider could choose to prescribe antibiotics or steroids, which might reduce the symptoms immediately but are unnecessary, expensive and medically harmful to the patient over the long term. Alternatively, the provider could prescribe regular cough formulas, which are appropriate, cheap, but may take some days to show an effect. The provider, with knowledge of medicine, would know that antibiotics and steroids are not clinically appropriate. The patient, on the other hand, without appropriate information on the long-term effects of the various treatment regimes, would typically prefer the seemingly 'fast-cure' antibiotics or steroids, and would trust the provider as 'effective' if these medicines are prescribed. An imperfect agent-provider would either initiate the use of antibiotics or satisfy the patient's request for such 'fast-cure' drugs without sharing the provider's own knowledge on the harmful effect of inappropriate antibiotic use. With medicines, the principal-agent relationship is complicated by the fact that patients' perceptions often do not come from scientifically proved knowledge (Craig 2000) . Because medicine use embodies deep cultural aspects, the principal-agent problem rests not only in the immediate shifting of the demand curve (increasing quantity), but also in sacrificing technical quality to gain patient trust at potential risk to the patient.
Hypotheses
In this article I test for the presence of the principal-agent problem in the private health market in Vietnam using the case of drug prescription and dispensing. I focus on curative outpatient care, because the private hospital sector is still relatively small. The principal-agent relationship is examined from the side of both the provider and the patient. In particular, I test for the presence of provider-induced demand for medicines, the provider decision to adopt a seemingly 'fast-cure' medicine that may not necessarily be for the sake of the patient's health, and the effect of patient education as a source of information and empowerment in counterbalancing the demand inducement by the provider. The 'fast-cure' medicine in this study is an injection drug, which patients have greatly favoured (Mediconsult 2003) . Although it is not clear from the data, the injection drug for the most part is likely to be antibiotics. The intravenous transfusion of vitamins could be another type of injection although this is less likely in the case of curative care.
It is noteworthy that provider-induced demand is easier to infer than to prove. The distinction between induced demand, defensive medicine and even genuine care for the patient is not always straightforward. For the case at hand, the behaviour of public providers is used as a benchmark for judging whether there is induced demand in the private sector. Although, as mentioned, incentives exist for public providers to induce services for their own interest, the link from an individual provider's behaviour to profits is much stronger in the case of the private sector. It is noteworthy that demand inducement is an interactive rather than unilateral process. The extent to which the providers are able to induce demand or to satisfy a patient's request for unnecessary services also depends on the information possessed by the patients. Profit-oriented providers will maximize the level of inducement by differentiating among their patients and exploiting those with the least information. Thus, the potential agency problems in the private health market can be tested with the following three hypotheses:
(1) For a similar patient and illness profile, private providers prescribe more drugs for each outpatient contact than do public providers. (2) For a similar patient and illness profile, private providers are more likely to prescribe injection drugs in an outpatient setting than are public providers. (3) Highly educated patients both receive fewer drugs and are less likely to receive injections than are lowly educated patients. Because the profit motivation is stronger in the private sector, the effect of the patient's education is stronger in the private than in the public health care market.
Data and methods

Data
Household data from the Vietnam National Health Survey (VNHS) conducted in 2001 and 2002 are used to test the hypotheses. The VNHS was the first comprehensive national health survey in Vietnam. It collected detailed information from more than 158 000 individuals on health conditions, insurance status, utilization, and expenditure on health services from public and private providers. Although Vietnam has conducted three national household surveys since the VNHS (the Living Standard Surveys 2004 Surveys , 2006 Surveys , and 2008 , none of them is as large and rich in health information as the VNHS. Regarding the particular question at hand, the VNHS is the only survey that allows for an examination of providers' prescribing and dispensing patterns.
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The key information for this analysis comes from two sections in the household survey. The first section asked whether the respondent had incurred any illness and injury during the 4 weeks preceding the survey, the severity and type of the illness, and whether the respondent had sought treatment for it. The second section asked about each outpatient healthseeking episode during the same period, regardless of whether or not the person was sick, as well as about the providers of services and the drugs dispensed. Within the second section, the sample is limited to curative care (recorded in the survey questionnaire as 'treatment of disease or injury').
A practical complication for linking health conditions with seeking medical care is that the two sections of the survey were administered independently from each other. It is possible that people who reported being ill did not end up seeking formal care. More importantly, for those who reported having more than one health problem and seeking medical care, we do not know for which health problems they sought medical care. To address this shortcoming in the data, an analytical sample was constructed that comprised only outpatient contacts reported by people who had one health problem and sought medical care for it. For this subset, it was possible to link the health condition for which the patient sought care with the provider of services. Out of 63 406 people who reported having an illness or injury over the four weeks preceding the survey, 53 229 (83%) had only one problem. Among these, nearly 28% sought formal medical care for the health problem reported. This leaves a final sample of 12 300 observations, which are measured in terms of contacts with health care providers. Table 1 describes all variables used in this study. Two outcomes of interest include the number of medicines prescribed and dispensed in an outpatient contact for curative care and the probability that an injection drug is administered. The key independent variable is provider type, comprising private clinic, public clinic (commonly known as commune health centre or inter-communal policlinic), public secondary-level hospital (district) and public tertiary-level hospital (provincial and central). The five health conditions reported during the 4 weeks preceding the survey included respiratory, diarrhoea, other acute illnesses, injury and chronic health problems. The severity of these health conditions is self rated by the respondent as mild, moderate or severe.
The multivariate analyses (described below) control for an array of survey respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, health insurance status, education, wealth and place of residence. For children aged 15 or younger, education of the mother is used instead. These variables are included because they may potentially confound the relationship between provider choice and medicine use. For example, urban residents may be more likely to see a private doctor for their health problems. They may also be prescribed more medicines because of better availability of medicines in the urban area. Failure to control for such confounding relationships may lead to under-or over-estimates of the provider's effects on medicine prescribed.
Methods
The analysis starts with a description of the sample and a bivariate analysis of drug prescription patterns with the key independent variables of interest. Where appropriate, 2 tests are performed to test for the systematic difference in the prescribing patterns across providers. To formally test the three hypotheses, four different multivariate regressions are conducted. For Hypothesis 1, the analysis takes the form of ordinary least squares for the number of drugs prescribed per contact with public clinic, secondary public hospital and tertiary public hospital, compared with a contact at a private clinic. For Hypothesis 2, probit estimate is performed comparing the probability of injection across providers. Marginal effects are reported, which denote percentage point increase or decrease in the probability of prescribing an injection during a contact with the three public providers compared with the private clinic. For Hypothesis 3, ordinary least squares and probit estimates are performed separately for private vs all three types of public providers combined. Here, the primary independent variable of interest is patient's education. All analyses apply survey sampling weights. Because each survey respondent can report more than one contact with one or more providers, standard errors are clustered at the individual respondent level. (table not  shown) . Given the regulation banning private providers from selling drugs, this finding raises a concern about the enforcement of regulations. Because dispensing almost always followed prescription, in the following discussion the words prescription and dispensing are used interchangeably. Table 2 reveals that most of the health problems reported during the 4 weeks prior to the survey were acute illness, most notably respiratory problems. Nearly 24% of the problems belonged to the chronic group. Twenty-two per cent of problems were perceived by respondents as severe. There was quite a strong gradient in the representation of various wealth groups in the sample, ranging from 14.5% for the poorest quintile to 22.3% for the richest quintile.
Results
Sample description
One could argue that public and private providers have different prescribing patterns because they see patients with different types and severities of health conditions. For example, private clinics in Vietnam are typically only comparable to public clinics and secondary-level hospitals in terms of technical complexity. To control for this confounding factor, the contacts are stratified by the type of health condition and its severity as perceived by the respondent. 
Independent variables
Providers of services Provider of service whom survey respondents reported seeing for the health problems they experienced in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. Four categories of providers are in place:
(1) Private clinic (2) Public clinic (commune health station) (3) Public secondary hospital (district) (4) Public tertiary hospital (provincial and central)
Health problems reported during 4 weeks preceding survey
Health problems the survey respondents reported having over 4 weeks preceding the survey. The sample includes those reporting only one problem (83% of respondents). The health problems belong to the following five categories:
(1) Respiratory (2) (1) Quintile 1 (poorest) (2) Quintile 2 (second poorest) (3) Quintile 3 (middle) (4) Quintile 4 (second richest) (5) Quintile 5 (richest)
Other characteristics Other characteristics of the survey respondent, including gender, age, whether being married and whether residing in the urban area.
Regions Socio-geographic regions of Vietnam as classified in official documents. There are eight regions as followed:
(1) Red River Delta tertiary hospitals (3.88). The difference is statistically significant for all types and severity levels of the reported health condition. Figure 1 shows the probability of prescribing an injection, by type of facility and illness. Looking across providers, we can see that contacts at private clinics have a much higher probability of injection prescription, ranging from 40% to 52% for diarrhoea and injury, respectively. In fact, injury is the only category in which public clinics are more likely than private providers to prescribe an injection. Interestingly, while the distinction between injury and other health conditions is clear among the three public providers, it is small as far as contacts in the private sector are concerned. In fact, the difference in the probability of having an injection among five health conditions in private clinics is statistically insignificant at the 10% level (figure not shown). Figure 2 shows a similar picture broken down by self-reported severity of illness. It reveals a strong downward gradient as one goes from private clinics to public facilities with increasing levels of complexity. The likelihood of injection being administered in private clinics is nearly four times as high as that in tertiary public hospitals for all degrees of severity (56% vs 15% in the severe category, for example). Table 4 presents the results of the ordinary least squares estimate of the number of drugs prescribed in an outpatient contact. The three categories of public facilities are compared with private clinics, which are the reference group. The regression controls for illness type and severity, as well as all patient characteristics and other covariates (figures not shown). As revealed, the coefficients for public facilities are all negative and strongly statistically significant. On average, a contact that occurred in a public clinic entailed 0.315 less drug items compared with one in a private clinic. This difference represents 8% of the sample mean, which is 3.849 (Table 2 ). The corresponding coefficients for public secondary and tertiary Table 4 show expected directions of effects. For example, compared with illness at a moderate level, a contact for severe illness involves, on average, 0.301 more drug items, and a contact for mild illness involves 0.320 fewer drug items. Relative to respiratory problems, all other health conditions require a smaller number of drugs. An interesting observation is that 'urban' has a strongly negative coefficient, suggesting that the degree of inducement in urban areas may be less due to better regulation of both the public and the private sectors. Table 5 shows the results of a probit estimate of the probability that an injection was offered during an outpatient consultation for curative care. The figures presented are marginal effects, and their robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The suppressed individual control variables are similar to those in Table 4 . As shown, all three categories of public providers were much less likely than private clinics to prescribe injections. For example, compared with a contact that occurred in a private clinic, a contact in a public clinic would have 13 percentage points lower probability of involving an injection. Given that the sample mean of injection prescription is 34.2% (Table 2) , this difference represents 38% of the sample mean. The higher the level of the public health facilities, the less likely it is that an injection was offered, controlling for disease and patient characteristics. The difference between the private clinics and public tertiary hospitals is more than 82% of the sample mean. Again, these results provide strong evidence to support Hypothesis 2, that private providers were more likely to prescribe an injection relative to public providers.
Number of drugs prescribed per outpatient contact
Prescription of injection drugs
All other variables in Table 5 show expected signs of association. For example, a contact for a severe health problem was more likely to involve an injection than that for a moderate health problem. All acute health conditions appear to involve an injection less often than respiratory infection. However, injury induces injection more often than any other health condition. Again, the effect of 'urban' is negative and highly significant, suggesting a much higher incidence of injection in rural areas of Vietnam. 
Effects of patient education on volume of drugs prescribed and likelihood of injection
To test Hypothesis 3, estimations of the two outcomes of interest are performed, using separate samples that comprise contacts in the private and public sectors, respectively. Table 6 shows the results of four estimations: ordinary least squares estimations for the number of drug items prescribed during a contact at private clinics (Model 1) and at all public facilities combined (Model 2); and probit estimation for the probability of injection at these two types of providers, respectively (Models 3 and 4). As always, all these models adjust for survey sampling weight and cluster the standard errors at the individual level. They all control for illness type and severity, as well as for the geographical regions in the country. For Models 3 and 4, the figures presented are marginal effects obtained from the probit models. The primary variable of interest in Table 6 is the respondent's education or that of the mother if the respondent is younger than 16.
Looking specifically at Model 1, we can see that, compared with the reference group, which are those who are illiterate or who have less than a primary education, the group with a primary education experiences no statistically significant difference. However, the two subsequent higher-education groups (secondary school and college) were prescribed a significantly smaller number of drug items. This pattern suggests that highly educated people may have been successful in influencing the private providers in a way that mitigates the provider's ability to induce demand for drugs among them. Because the regression has controlled for the severity and type of illness, it is unlikely that this observed education effect is confounded Reference groups for shown covariates include illiterate, quintile 1 (poorest) and uninsured. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. by the fact that highly educated people are more prompt in seeking care and hence their health conditions require fewer drugs. Model 2 provides an interesting comparison from outpatient contacts in the public sector. Here none of the education groups is statistically significant, and in fact, they do not follow a consistent sign. Thus, it appears that patient education is more important in encounters with private providers than in encounters with public providers. Another interesting difference between Models 1 and 2 is the effect of income, which is insignificant in 1 but highly significant and positive in 2. Models 3 and 4 reveal a qualitatively similar effect of education for contacts in the private vs public sectors in the case of injection. Quantitatively and statistically, the difference is much more pronounced. Among the contacts in the private sector, the education gradient is particularly strong, with highly educated patients being much less likely to receive injections than the lowly educated ones. Among the public sector contacts, education effect is consistently negative, yet not statistically significant.
The relationship between the outcomes of interest and several other covariates in Table 6 is worth noting. For example, in terms of injection (Models 3 and 4), insurance status in adults is marginally significant in the case of the private sector but negative and strongly significant in the case of the public sector. Because social health insurance in Vietnam barely contracted with any private providers at the time of the research, one should not expect to see any effect among the contacts in the private sector. Yet in the public sector, the negative sign may be explained by the fact that insurance agencies scrutinized the providers to make sure they could not abuse the service easily. As in Tables 4 and 5 , urban effect remains negative and strongly significant in three out of four models in Table 6 , suggesting that regulation could be an issue in both the public and private sectors in rural areas.
Discussion
The current study thus has found evidence supporting the presence of principal-agent problems in the private health care market in Vietnam. Not only did the private providers shift out the patients' demand curve for drugs in curative outpatient care, but they also prescribed injection drugs unnecessarily, which may cause physical harm to the patients. For a similar patient and illness profile, an outpatient contact in the private sector typically entailed from 0.233 to 0325 more drug items than a contact in the public sector, and the probability of injection drugs was 13 to 28 percentage points higher. Given that medicines account for a major portion of health care costs and that the private sector occupies a large share of ambulatory service provision, the public health risks of over-prescribing by private providers are significant.
An interesting finding from this study is that the provider's behaviours can be influenced by an array of patient characteristics, in particular education. In line with the principal-agent theory, I posit that education equips patients with information and empowerment, which they can use to negotiate for a treatment alternative more in their favour. The findings also suggest that regulation and checks from a third party, whether it is an authoritative body in charge or an insurance agency, can provide another guard against provider-induced demand in the health care market in Vietnam. This suggestion is reflected in the consistent negative effect of urban residence and, to a lesser extent, of insurance status on the number of drugs and the probability of injection.
It is important to note several limitations in this study. The public sector is used as a benchmark to judge the degree of induced demand in the private sector, yet it is not possible to rule out completely the possibility of induced demand in the public sector itself. If induced demand exists in the public sector, the magnitude detected in this study will be on a lower bound. More importantly, due to data limitations, it is not possible to affirm that injections are absolutely equivalent to antibiotics. The quality of the prescription also cannot be assessed, nor whether the prescribed medicines were generic or brand name, which would shed much light on the profit motivation of the providers.
Limitations notwithstanding, this study potentially makes valuable contributions to the current knowledge of the private health care market. It is one of the very few studies documenting the presence of provider-induced demand in a developing country setting. It touches upon the issue of medicines, which has major cost and socio-cultural implications. Finally, the study combines provider and patient aspects, which allows for an assessment of the health care market from both the supply and the demand sides. Bennett et al. (1994) recommended an array of regulation and incentive structures to influence the provider behaviours. In their framework, key players include not only the providers and their professional organizations, but also consumers, the state and the third-party payers. Bennett et al.'s framework is highly applicable to the private sector in Vietnam. The case is strong for enforced regulation of private providers through licensing and inspection. Incentive structures can be manipulated by involving the private sector in the service provision for social health insurance and by employing a different payment method. Patients should be educated on rational drug use and should be empowered through a supply of information. These are valuable lessons not only for Vietnam, but also for other countries in their efforts to make the private provider a perfect agent for their population.
